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Abstract 
This paper argues for the following three theses: (1) There is a clear reason to prefer physical 
theories with deterministic dynamical equations: such theories are maximally rich in information 
and usually also maximally simple. (2) There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a 
deterministic physical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of a specific 
system we can reasonably expect under ignorance of its exact initial conditions. This procedure 
works in the same manner for both classical and quantum physics. (3) There is no cogent reason 
to take the parameters that enter into the (deterministic) dynamical equations of physics to refer 
to properties of the physical systems. Granting an ontological status to parameters such as mass, 
charge, wave functions and the like does not lead to a gain in explanation, but only to artificial 
problems. Against this background, I argue that there is no conflict between determinism in 
physics and free will (on whatever conception of free will), and, in general, point out the limits 
of science when it comes to the central metaphysical issues. 
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1. Determinism and probabilities in physics 
The central claim of this paper is that laws in physics, even deterministic laws, do not pose a 
threat to human free will. That claim is intended to come out as a consequence of considering 
the role of laws and probabilities in physics as well as an argument to the effect that a certain 
version of Humeanism, dubbed Super-Humeanism, offers the best metaphysical account of 
these laws as they figure in our physical theories. Therefore, the paper first goes into 
determinism and probabilities (this section), then considers the ontological status of the 
magnitudes that enter into the laws of physics (section 2) and finally draws conclusions for 
free will (section 3). 
Atomism is the paradigm on which the success of modern science is based. It is the idea 
that matter is composed of tiny, indivisible particles. In fact, atomism is as old as philosophy, 
going back to the Presocratics Leucippus and Democritus. The latter is reported as 
maintaining that 
... substances infinite in number and indestructible, and moreover without action or affection, 
travel scattered about in the void. When they encounter each other, collide, or become entangled, 
collections of them appear as water or fire, plant or man. (fragment Diels-Kranz 68 A57, quoted 
from Graham 2010, p. 537). 
To turn to contemporary physics, Feynman says at the beginning of the famous Feynman 
lectures: 
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If, in some cataclysm, all of scientific knowledge were to be destroyed, and only one sentence 
passed on to the next generations of creatures, what statement would contain the most 
information in the fewest words? I believe it is the atomic hypothesis (or the atomic fact, or 
whatever you wish to call it) that all things are made of atoms – little particles that move around 
in perpetual motion, attracting each other when they are a little distance apart, but repelling 
upon being squeezed into one another. In that one sentence, you will see, there is an enormous 
amount of information about the world, if just a little imagination and thinking are applied. 
(Feynman et al. 1963, ch. 1-2) 
What makes atomism attractive is evident from these quotations: on the one hand, it is a 
proposal for an ontology of nature that is most parsimonious and most general. On the other 
hand, it offers a clear and simple explanation of the realm of the objects that are accessible to 
us in perception. Any such object is composed of a finite number of discrete, pointlike 
particles. All the differences between these objects – at a time as well as in time – are 
accounted for in terms of the spatial configuration of these particles and its change. This view 
is implemented in classical mechanics. It conquered the whole of physics via classical 
statistical mechanics (e.g. heat as molecular motion), chemistry via the periodic table of 
elements, biology via molecular biology (e.g. molecular composition of the DNA), and finally 
neuroscience – neurons are composed of atoms, and neuroscience is applied physics (applied 
classical mechanics and electrodynamics, or, maybe, quantum mechanics in case quantum 
effects are proven to be operational in the brain). 
What is relevant for the account of the perceptible macroscopic objects are only the relative 
positions of the point particles – that is to say, how far apart they are from each other, i.e. 
their distances – and the change of these distances. Let’s call the particles “matter points”. 
They can be considered as substances because they persist. However, in contrast to almost all 
the traditional philosophical accounts of substances, they are not Aristotelian substances in 
the sense of objects that have an inner form (eidos) – in other words, that are characterized by 
some intrinsic properties. There is nothing more to the matter points than the way in which 
they are spatially arranged and the change in their arrangement. But that is sufficient for their 
individuation: each matter point can be distinguished by – and hence individuated by – the 
distances it bears to the other matter points in a given configuration. 
More precisely, if there is a configuration of N matter points i, j, k …, there are 1/2(N–1) 
distance relations. These relations are irreflexive, symmetric and connex (meaning that all 
matter points in a given configuration are related with one another). They satisfy the triangle 
inequality. For these relations to individuate the matter points, we have to stipulate that if 
matter point i is not identical with matter point j, then the two sets that list all the distance 
relations in which these points stand with respect to all the other points in a configuration 
must differ in at least one such relation. We thereby exclude entirely symmetrical 
configurations among others. This is a structural individuation of the physical objects by 
relations in contrast to intrinsic essences. It has the great advantage that we do not have to 
endorse the numerical plurality of matter points as a primitive fact, which would imply that 
the matter points are bare particulars or bare substrata. Instead, they are individuated by the 
distance relations. To put it in a nutshell, matter, consisting in matter points, is what is 
individuated by its standing in distance relations to each other (by contrast to minds, angles, 
or abstract objects, which, if they exist, do not stand in spatial relations). 
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We can thus sum up the gist of atomism in these two axioms (for a detailed argument, see 
Esfeld and Deckert 2017, ch. 2.1, as well as Esfeld 2017 for a concise metaphysical 
argument): 
(1) There are distance relations that individuate simple objects, namely matter points. 
(2) The matter points are permanent, with the distances between them changing. 
Let’s call the ontology of nature defined by these two axioms the primitive ontology: matter 
points individuated by distances and their change are the ultimate referent of our physical 
theories, the bedrock of nature according to science so to speak. 
However, the idea of matter being constituted by atoms in the sense of matter points is not 
sufficient to fulfil the promise of atomism, namely to explain everything in nature on the basis 
of the atomic hypothesis. That explanation is not carried out by the hypothesis of the atomic 
constitution of matter as such, but by showing how the change in the atomic composition of 
macroscopic objects accounts for their perceptible change. In other words, in order to fulfil 
the promise of atomism, one has in the first place to provide for laws of motion of the matter 
points and then to show how from these laws one also gets to an explanation of the motions of 
the macroscopic objects with which we are familiar. But the conceptual means provided by 
the primitive ontology – that is, the concepts of matter points, distances and their change 
admitted as primitive – are not sufficient to formulate a law of motion. Using only these 
conceptual means, one could not do much better than just listing the change that actually 
occurs, but not formulate a simple law that captures that change. The reason is that there is 
nothing about the distance relations in any given configuration of matter that provides 
information about the evolution of these relations. 
To extract such information from the configuration of matter, we have to embed that 
configuration in a geometry and a dynamics: we have to conceive the configuration of matter 
as being embedded in a space with a fully-fledged metric (such as three-dimensional 
Euclidean space) – although in the ontology, there are only distance relations and their 
change, but not an absolute space or space-time. Furthermore, we have to attribute parameters 
to the configuration of matter that are introduced in terms of their functional role for the 
change in the distance relations. These can be parameters that are attributed to the matter 
points individually (such as mass, momentum, charge), to their entire configuration (such as 
total energy, or an initial wave function), or constants of nature (such as the gravitational 
constant). They can always remain the same (such as mass and charge) or vary as the distance 
relations among the matter points change (such as momentum, a wave function, etc.). In any 
case, conceiving the configuration of matter as being embedded in a geometrical space and as 
being endowed with parameters that are set up in terms of their function for the change in the 
distance relations then enables the formulation of a physical law. Let us call these parameters 
and the geometry, providing for physical laws, the dynamical structure of a physical theory. 
In fact, the geometry, the dynamical parameters and the laws come as a package: the precise 
functional definition of the dynamical parameters involves the law, and the law is formulated 
by using the dynamical parameters as well as the geometry. But there is no threatening 
circularity here: roughly speaking, all three are conjectured at once and then made precise 
together in order to achieve a theory that is simple and rich in informational content. 
The claim then is that the primitive ontology remains constant – from Democritos to 
today’s physics –, whereas the dynamical structure changes as we make more progress in 
formulating a theory that describes the evolution of the configuration of matter in a way that 
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is ever more informative, while remaining as simple, general and informative as possible (for 
details, see Esfeld and Deckert 2017, ch. 2.2). In other words, there is something in a physical 
theory that serves as the – ultimate – referent of the theory, what there simply is in nature 
according to the theory. That something can be specified independently of the theory change 
in the history of science: atoms in the guise of matter points characterized by their relative 
positions and the change of these positions are that something. Furthermore, there is 
something in a physical theory that is introduced in terms of the role that it plays (i.e. its 
function) for the evolution of what there simply is according to the theory. 
Thus, in classical mechanics, point particles characterized by their relative positions are 
what there simply is according to the theory – they have no further function in the theory 
apart from filling the place of the candidate for what simply exists in nature –, whereas the 
parameter of mass, for instance, is introduced in terms of what it does for the motion of the 
particles. As, for instance, Mach (1919, p. 241) points out when commenting on Newton’s 
Principia, “The true definition of mass can be deduced only from the dynamical relations of 
bodies”. That is to say, both inertial and gravitational mass are introduced through their 
dynamical role, namely as dynamical parameters that couple the motions of the particles to 
one another. In general, even if attributed to the particles taken individually, mass, charge, etc. 
express a dynamical relation between the particles instead of describing an intrinsic essence 
of the basic objects. As Hall (2009, § 5.2) puts it, 
the primary aim of physics – its first order business, as it were – is to account for motions, or 
more generally for change of spatial configurations of things over time. Put another way, there is 
one Fundamental Why-Question for physics: Why are things located where they are, when they 
are? In trying to answer this question, physics can of course introduce new physical magnitudes 
– and when it does, new why-questions will come with them. 
This, again, alludes to the crucial distinction between primitive ontology and dynamical 
structure: the fundamental issue is the location of things and its change. The account of this 
fundamental issue requires the introduction of further parameters that allow us to formulate 
laws about how the change of location of things occurs. 
Fields can with good reason be taken to belong also to the dynamical structure of physical 
theories instead of being part and parcel of the primitive ontology. In brief, (a) all the 
evidence for fields derives from evidence of particle motion. More importantly, (b) if one 
includes fields on a par with particles in the primitive ontology, the mathematical problem 
that there is no rigorous formulation of a physical theory of particle-field interactions, neither 
in classical electrodynamics nor in quantum field theory, becomes a philosophical problem 
how to conceive the interaction of these entities in the ontology. However, (c) if fields belong 
to the primitive ontology, their status is not clear: Are they properties of space-time points, 
albeit not geometrical ones? And why should only some space-time points have these causal 
properties (i.e. those where the field magnitudes are not zero)? Are they some sort of a bare 
substratum physical stuff? As Feynman puts it in his Nobel lecture, 
You see, if all charges contribute to making a single common field, and if that common field acts 
back on all the charges, then each charge must act back on itself. Well, that is where the mistake 
was, there was no field. It was just that when you shook one charge, another would shake later. 
There was a direct interaction between charges, albeit with a delay. … Now, this has the 
attractive feature that it solves both problems at once. First, I can say immediately, I don’t let the 
electron act on itself, I just let this act on that, hence, no self-energy! Secondly, there is not an 
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infinite number of degrees of freedom in the field. There is no field at all. (Feynman 1966, pp. 
699-700; see Lazarovici 2018 for a detailed exposition of the arguments against a commitment 
to fields in the ontology of physics). 
Also in what is known today as the standard model of particle physics in the framework of 
quantum field theory, the ontology of this physics can be set up in terms of a particle ontology 
only and the conceptual problems that this physics raises can thereby be answered (for a 
detailed account, see Esfeld and Deckert 2017, ch. 4). 
In general, the benchmark for the dynamical structure of a physical theory is to simplify the 
representation of the change that takes place in the configuration of matter – by contrast to 
merely dressing a list of that change – without losing the information about the change that 
actually occurs. The common way to achieve this benchmark is to specify a dynamical 
structure such that, for any configuration of matter given as initial condition, the law fixes 
how the universe would evolve if that configuration were the actual one. The dynamical 
structure then goes beyond the actual configuration of matter: it fixes for any possible 
configuration of matter what the evolution of the universe would be like if that configuration 
were actual. It thereby supports counterfactual propositions. 
Against this background, it is evident why determinism is a virtue of a physical theory: 
dynamical parameters figuring in laws that fix all the change, given an initial configuration of 
matter, are the simplest and most informative way to capture change. In other words, in the 
ideal case, the law is such that given an initial configuration of matter as input, the law yields 
a description of all the – past and future – change of the configuration as output. The question 
that remains in this case only is whether that description is empirically correct and whether it 
can be further simplified without losing informational content. It may turn out that, as a 
matter of fact, such a law cannot be achieved. It may also be that an indeterministic theory is 
simpler than a deterministic one and that the gain in simplicity outweighs the gain in 
informational content that a deterministic theory provides, such that, when seeking for the 
best balance between these two criteria, the indeterministic theory wins (see Werndl 2013 for 
a detailed elaboration on these issues). That notwithstanding, if there are dynamical 
parameters that designate only possibilities for how the configuration of matter may evolve, 
given an initial configuration, there always remains the question open whether one can do 
better, that is, find dynamical parameters that fix that change. 
In any case, a fundamental physical theory is such that it defines a dynamical structure for 
the configuration of matter of the whole universe. For example, in Newtonian gravitation, the 
acceleration of any particle at any time depends, strictly speaking, on the positions and 
masses of all the other particles in the universe at that time. Even if action at a distance in 
Newtonian gravitation is replaced with local action in classical field theories, as soon as there 
are globally conserved quantities (such as total energy), the motion of any one object in the 
universe then is represented as being correlated with, in the end, the motion of any other 
object in the universe such that the quantity in question is globally conserved. In quantum 
physics, again, strictly speaking, due to entanglement, there is only one wave function for the 
configuration of matter as a whole at any given time (i.e. the universal wave function). 
On the one hand, thus, the dynamical structure of a fundamental physical theory is defined 
for the universe as a whole. On the other hand, any such dynamical structure is per se useless 
for calculations. We cannot know initial conditions for the configuration of matter as a whole. 
Furthermore, the evolution of a given configuration of matter points that we can manipulate 
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may be extremely sensitive to perturbations on its initial conditions. Hence, a slight error 
about the initial conditions may lead to a great error in predicting the evolution of the system. 
Already this fact makes clear that there is no conceptual link between deterministic laws and 
our ability to predict with certainty the evolution of a given system. Everything depends on 
the extent to which we can specify the initial conditions of a system and on how sensitive the 
evolution of the system is to slight variations of its initial conditions. 
By way of consequence, setting out a primitive ontology and a dynamical structure is not 
sufficient to build up a physical theory. The dynamical structure has to be construed in such a 
way that it allows us to answer the following question: What evolution of a given system can 
we typically expect – that is, in the vast majority of situations – under ignorance of its exact 
initial conditions? For instance, when flipping a coin, it is impossible to predict the individual 
outcomes and thus to predict the exact sequence of heads and tails, although this sequence is 
completely determined by the laws of classical mechanics and the initial conditions. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to derive the proposition that in by far the most cases, the number 
of heads will be almost equal to the number of tails provided that the number of coin flips is 
large enough. There are situations in which we can predict individual outcomes, such as when 
throwing a stone on Earth, but these are the exception rather than the rule. The dynamical 
structure of a physical theory therefore has to be linked with a typicality or probability 
measure by means of which we can derive propositions about which evolution of particular 
systems we can expect to obtain in most cases under ignorance of the exact initial conditions. 
There hence is a clear reason why even a deterministic physical theory requires probabilities 
and a detailed procedure how to introduce them on the basis of – fundamental and universal – 
laws (for details, see Esfeld and Deckert, ch. 3.4). 
As regards classical mechanics, notably Boltzmann has established how to derive such 
probabilistic statements from the deterministic laws via a typicality or probability measure 
(see Lazarovici and Reichert 2015 for a detailed account). Classical statistical mechanics then 
paved the way for developing atomism into precise scientific theories also in chemistry, 
biology and beyond. As regards quantum mechanics, it is by no means evident that the 
situation with respect to probabilities is different from the one in classical physics. It is a fact 
that situations like the classical coin toss are generic in quantum mechanics – that is, 
situations that are highly sensitive to slight variations of the initial conditions, and we cannot 
know these initial conditions with arbitrary precision. This fact is brought out by 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations. Consequently, we can only make predictions about the 
statistical distributions of measurement outcomes by using Born’s rule, but in general not 
predictions about individual measurement outcomes. 
However, this fact does not imply that probabilities have another status in quantum 
mechanics than in classical mechanics. The question is what the law of motion for the 
evolution of the individual quantum systems is that underlies Born’s rule for the calculation 
of measurement outcome statistics. Only if one includes what is introduced in the textbook 
presentations of quantum mechanics as the postulate of the collapse of the wave function 
upon measurement into the law does one obtain an indeterministic law in quantum mechanics. 
Doing so requires amending the Schrödinger equation with parameters that include the 
collapse of the wave function under certain circumstances. As things stand, these parameters 
have to be introduced by hand and compromise the simplicity of the law (see Ghirardi, Rimini 
and Weber 1986). Furthermore, they lead to predictions that deviate from the textbook ones in 
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certain specific situations. In any case, it is an open issue whether such an indeterministic law 
is a fundamental or rather a phenomenological one – taking gravitation into account, for 
example, may turn this law into a deterministic one (see Penrose 2004, ch. 30). The only 
example of a candidate for an indeterministic law in a fundamental physical theory hence 
confirms the general statement made above, namely that in the case of an indeterministic law, 
it remains an open issue whether that law can be turned into a deterministic one by including 
further parameters. 
Apart from the version of quantum mechanics that includes the postulate of the collapse of 
the wave function in the physical law, there are two other versions that both are deterministic. 
In brief, the version going back to Everett (1957) admits only the Schrödinger equation and, 
in consequence, no unique measurement outcomes. It is therefore known as many worlds 
quantum mechanics, because, in short, every possible outcome of a measurement becomes 
real in a branch of the universe (see Wallace 2012 for details). The version going back to 
Bohm (1952) adds to the (deterministic) Schrödinger equation a further (deterministic) law, 
known as the guiding equation, that describes, in brief, how the particles move in physical 
space as guided by the wave function. In the elaboration of this theory known as Bohmian 
mechanics, it is shown how Born’s rule can be deduced from these laws by means of a 
typicality or probability measure that is linked with these laws in a way that matches the way 
in which the probability calculus of classical statistical mechanics is deduced from the 
deterministic laws of classical mechanics (see Dürr et al. 2013, ch. 2). The existence of 
Bohmian mechanics hence refutes any attempt to infer from Born’s rule – or the Heisenberg 
uncertainty relations, or the randomness of individual measurement outcomes – the 
conclusion that probabilities have a more fundamental status in quantum mechanics than in 
classical mechanics. The question is what the law is that underlies Born’s rule. The standard 
for assessing the proposals for that law is independent of the issue of determinism vs. 
indeterminism. The standard is what is the best solution to the quantum measurement problem 
(as illustrated, for instance, in Schrödinger’s cat paradox). There are cogent arguments in 
favour of the Bohmian solution to this problem (see e.g. Esfeld 2014). The consequence then 
is that probabilities in quantum physics have the same status as probabilities in classical 
physics. 
To sum this section up: 
(1) There is a clear reason to seek for deterministic laws in the formulation of a physical 
theory, since these maximize informational content and usually also simplicity. 
(2) There is a clear procedure available how to get from fundamental deterministic laws to 
predictions about statistical distributions of measurement outcomes both in classical and in 
quantum physics. 
(3) Apparently random behaviour of investigated systems (including rules stating that 
randomness, such as the Heisenberg uncertainty relations) never justifies the conclusion to 
indeterminism. The issue is what the laws underlying this behaviour are. It is true that the 
determinism in classical mechanics would lose persuasiveness if there were not the clear cut 
paradigm examples of deterministic predictions in classical gravity (such as throwing a stone 
on Earth), and it is a fact that there are no such clear cut cases in quantum mechanics. But this 
is merely a heuristic matter. There is no conceptual link from deterministic laws to 
deterministic predictions, and, hence, no link from probabilistic predictions to probabilistic 
laws either. 
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2. Explanations in physics 
The raison d’être for laws in physics is that they explain the observed phenomena by 
subsuming them under a law – in whatever way one then spells out in philosophy of science 
how bringing phenomena under a law explains them (covering law, causal explanation, 
unification, just to name the most prominent accounts). This role of the laws raises the issue 
of their ontological status. In any case, as regards our knowledge, we cannot but make 
conjectures about what the laws are based on the data that become available to us. The 
standard for these conjectures is the extent to which they optimize both simplicity and 
informational content in accounting for the data. According to the stance known as 
Humeanism in today’s metaphysics, this is all there is to the laws: they are nothing more than 
means of representation that seek to optimize simplicity and informational content. Super-
Humeanism goes beyond standard Humeanism (see e.g. Lewis 1986, introduction) by putting 
the geometry and the dynamical parameters – that is, the dynamical structure – also on the 
side of the laws: the ontology is only the primitive ontology, such as matter points 
individuated by distance relations and the change in these relations. That change manifests 
certain patterns. Geometry, dynamical parameters and the laws linked with a probability 
measure are the package that enables us to achieve a representation of these patterns that is 
both as simple about the patterns and as informative about the change as possible (see Esfeld 
and Deckert 2017, ch. 2.3, for details). 
(Super-)Humeanism is distinct from instrumentalism. It is a scientific realism: the claim is 
that what there is as far as the ontology of the natural world is concerned is exhausted by the 
primitive ontology. Dynamical parameters have a nomological role by figuring in the laws of 
nature. From that nomological role then derives their role in the predictions, as the laws are 
linked with a procedure to derive probabilities from them as sketched out in the previous 
section. The claim of Humeanism then is that the laws do not require additional ontological 
commitments. The claim of Super-Humeanism is that geometry, dynamical parameters and 
laws form a package that has only a representational purpose and that does hence not call for 
ontological commitments that reach beyond the primitive ontology. In short, the issue is what 
the ontology of the natural world is in a scientific realist framework. 
Of course, physics explains the motions of bodies by using a geometry and dynamical 
parameters that appear in laws. However, the argument for an ontological commitment to the 
geometry and the dynamical parameters cannot simply be that they figure in our best physical 
theories. Reading the ontology off from the mathematical structure of physical theories would 
be begging the question of an argument for ontological commitments that go beyond what is 
minimally sufficient to account for the phenomena in a scientific realist vein, namely the 
commitment to a primitive ontology as given, for instance, by the two axioms of distance 
relations individuating matter points and the change in these relations. In a metaphysics based 
on science, the argument can only be that by subscribing to ontological commitments that go 
beyond that minimum, one achieves a gain in explanation. 
(Super-)Humeanism can accommodate the scientific practice of explanations and its 
conceptualisation in terms of covering laws, causation or unification. There is no space in this 
paper to expand on this claim (see notably Loewer 2012 for details and the ensuing debate 
with Lange 2013, Miller 2015 and Marshall 2015). The core idea of the (Super-)Humean 
account is this one: the geometry and the dynamical structure of a physical theory explain the 
phenomena by bringing out the patterns or regularities in the motion of the particles; bringing 
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out these patterns or regularities requires no ontological commitment beyond particles that 
move. On (Super-)Humeanism, first comes the particle motion, which as a contingent matter 
of fact exhibits certain patterns or regularities, then come the laws, including the geometry. 
Hence, the laws, the parameters figuring in them and the geometry are not some sort of an 
agent that forces the particles to move in a certain way. The laws do not constrain the particle 
motion. It is the particle motion that fixes the laws. Hence, if one asks why there are the 
patterns in the particle motion that there are in fact, (Super-)Humeanism cannot answer that 
question. The claim of (Super-)Humeanism is that there is no scientific answer to that 
question. Our scientific understanding of the world comes to an end once the salient patterns 
in the change of the elements of the primitive ontology are reached, such as, for instance, 
attractive particle motion. 
The argument for this claim is the one illustrated in Molière’s piece Le malade imaginaire: 
one does not explain why people fall asleep after the consumption of opium by endorsing a 
dormitive virtue of opium, because the dormitive virtue is defined in terms of its functional 
role to make people fall asleep after the consumption of opium. By the same token, one does 
not obtain a gain in explaining attractive particle motion by subscribing to an ontological 
commitment to gravitational mass as a property of the particles, because mass is defined in 
terms of its functional role of making objects attract one another as described by the law of 
gravitation. Of course, mass, charge and the like are fundamental and universal physical 
magnitudes, by contrast to the dormitive virtue of opium. But the point is that they are defined 
in terms of the functional role that they exert for the particle motion. Why do objects move as 
they do? Because they have properties whose function it is to make them move as they do. An 
ontological commitment to such properties does not yield a gain in explanation. The same 
holds for forces, fields, wave functions, an ontic structure of entanglement in quantum 
physics, laws conceived as primitive, etc. It also applies to geometry: it is no gain in 
explanation to trace the characteristic features of the distance relation back to the geometry of 
an absolute space, because that geometry is defined such that it allows for the conception of 
distances in that space. 
It is true that by tracing the distance relations back to an absolute space, or the change in 
the distance relations back to properties of the particles that are dispositions for that very 
change, the characteristic features of the distance relations as well as those of the patterns in 
the change in them come out as necessary instead of contingent. However, merely shifting the 
status of something from contingent to necessary does not amount to a gain in explanation. 
Quite to the contrary, one only faces drawbacks that come with the commitment to a surplus 
structure in the ontology in the guise of an absolute space, fundamental dispositional 
properties of the particles, ontic dynamical structures of entanglement, etc.: differences with 
respect to absolute space that do not make a difference in the configuration of matter, 
questions such as how an object can influence the motion of other objects across space in 
virtue of properties that are intrinsic to it, how a wave function defined on configuration space 
can pilot the motion of matter in physical space, etc. (see Esfeld and Deckert 2017, ch. 2.3). 
To sum this section up: 
(1) The business of physics is to achieve on the basis of the available evidence a theory that 
is as simple and as informative as possible in accounting for that evidence and in predicting 
new evidence, with such a theory being characterized by the three features outlined in the 
previous section. 
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(2) Given the primitive ontology in terms of the notions of distances individuating matter 
points and the change of these distances, one can then define any further notion that one needs 
in one’s theory of the natural world in terms of its functional role in the represenation of that 
change, without thereby subscribing to an additional ontological commitment. An ontology 
that is limited to a primitive ontology of matter points individuated by distance relations and 
the change in these relations is a scientific realism that is sufficient to accommodate scientific 
explanations. 
(3) Subscribing to an ontological commitment that goes beyond what is minimally 
sufficient to account for the evidence (i.e. the primitive ontology) is not implied by the 
physics: one cannot read off the ontology from the mathematical structure of a physical 
theory. The issue can only be whether granting that structure an ontological status over and 
above the primitive ontology yields an explanatory gain. However, far from doing so, such an 
enriched ontology leads only to drawbacks stemming from a commitment to surplus structure. 
3. Free will and the limits of physics 
Minimizing the ontological commitments of physics as outlined in the two preceding sections, 
while fully respecting scientific realism, not only prevents artificial problems from arising in 
the philosophy of nature, but also has repercussions for metaphysics in general. In particular, 
against the background set out here, one can establish the conclusion that there is no conflict 
between physical determinism and free will – although, at first glance, there obviously seems 
to be such a conflict. 
Suppose that classical mechanics were the correct physical theory of the universe. Then, 
given an initial state of the particle motion throughout the whole universe (which includes the 
attribution of values of mass to the particles over and above initial positions and velocities) 
and the laws of classical mechanics, the entire evolution of the universe is fixed by the laws – 
that is, the entire future evolution from that state on as well as the entire past evolution 
leading to that state; that is why this can be an initial state at an arbitrary time. Of course, 
already in classical mechanics, as pointed out at the end of section 1, nobody within the 
universe could know its initial state at any time with enough precision to turn the determinism 
implemented in the laws into predictions. 
If one considers physical determinism to be troublesome when it comes to human free will, 
a little reflection shows that the determinism implemented in the dynamical structure of 
classical mechanics is not the reason for the trouble. The reason is the very fact of there being 
universal physical laws. Suppose that a version of quantum mechanics that includes what is 
known as the collapse of the wave function in the fundamental dynamical law were the 
correct physical theory of the universe (such as the theory of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 
1986 mentioned at the end of section 1) and that the collapse of the wave function is an 
irreducibly stochastic process. Nevertheless, the dynamical law then fixes objective 
probabilities for wave function collapse to occur such that, given an initial quantum state of 
the universe at an arbitrary time that includes an initial wave function of the universe, several 
possible future evolutions of the universe are fixed with objective probabilities attached to 
them. If the decisions of human beings concerning the motions of their bodies can influence 
neither the initial state of the universe nor the deterministic laws of classical mechanics (on 
the supposition that they are the correct laws of the universe), they cannot influence the 
objective probabilities implemented in a fundamental stochastic law and an initial wave 
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function either (on the supposition that wave function collapse is stochastic and included in 
the fundamental dynamical law of the universe) (see Loewer 1996). Hence, supposing that 
there is a conflict between deterministic physical laws and free will, one could not draw any 
profit for free will if the laws were indeterministic. If there is such a conflict, it concerns the 
very fact of there being universal physical laws, be they deterministic or not. 
The common formulation that, in the case of determinism, the laws plus the initial 
conditions fix the entire evolution of the objects to which they apply may suggest that the 
laws somehow bring about the evolution of these objects. However, if this were so, the laws 
would bring about the past evolution of the objects from an arbitrary initial state back as well 
as the future evolution of the objects from an arbitrary initial state on. But no one thinks that 
the fact that given an initial state and a deterministic dynamical law, the past evolution 
leading to that state is fixed implies that the law brings about the past evolution by 
retrocausation. Hence, the mere statement of determinism contains no reason to think that the 
law brings about the future evolution either. A better formulation of determinism that avoids 
any ontological connotation of the verb “fix” therefore is this one: the propositions stating the 
laws of nature and the propositions describing the state of the world at an arbitrary time t (i.e. 
the propositions describing the initial conditions) entail the propositions describing the state 
of the world at any other time. Thus formulated, it is clear that determinism in science is – 
only – about entailment relations among propositions. The question then is, supposing that 
determinism is true, what it is in the world that makes these propositions true, that is, in virtue 
of what in the ontology these entailment relations among propositions hold. 
On the conception of physical laws sketched out in the preceding section, there can be no 
clash between laws of nature and free will (in whatever way one may conceive free will). The 
reason is, in brief, that the motion comes first, including the motion of our bodies that is the 
expression of our intentions, then come the laws. In other words, what makes the propositions 
that state the laws true is the entire motion of the objects in the universe, that is, the change 
that actually occurs throughout the entire evolution of the configuration of matter of the 
universe. If the laws are “mere patterns in the phenomena”, as Hall (2009, p. 1) puts it, they 
do not govern or constrain those phenomena, let alone bring them about. Hence, in this case, 
there is no clash between laws of nature and human free will possible, since the bodily 
movements that humans choose to make are part of the phenomena. The laws are there to 
achieve an account of the motions that actually occur that is both maximally simple and 
maximally informative. Consequently, the laws do not predetermine our actions, they only 
represent what happens in nature (see Beebee and Mele 2002). 
Only if one loads the laws of physics with some sort of necessitation – such as by 
conceiving them as modal primitives, tracing them back to fundamental dispositions, powers 
or modal ontic structures instantiated by the physical objects – can a conflict with free will 
ensue (at least on an incompatibilist conception of free will); there then is something in the 
world that is independent of our decisions and that makes our decisions necessary. However, 
as far as the ontology of physics is concerned, there is no need to subscribe to any such 
commitment, and doing so leads only to drawbacks, as argued in the previous section. 
Consider the famous consequence argument by means of which van Inwagen seeks to 
establish a conflict between free will and determinism: 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the 
remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us 
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what the laws of nature are. Therefore the consequences of these things (including our pre-sent 
acts) are not up to us. (van Inwagen 1983, p. 16) 
On the view defended in this paper, the statement “it is not up to us what went on before we 
were born” is ambiguous if it refers to the initial state of the universe and the statement 
“neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are” is, strictly speaking, not quite correct. The 
latter statement is not quite correct on any version of Humeanism about laws, for the just 
mentioned reason that what goes on in the universe comes first and then come the laws. 
However, it would be implausible to take this to imply that if a person had chosen to do 
otherwise, the laws of nature would have been different. 
Here again the virtues of Super-Humeanism show up: it is not only the laws, but the entire 
dynamical structure of the correct physical theory of the universe that depend on the change 
in the universe as a whole. As argued in the first section, all the dynamical parameters that are 
introduced in terms of their functional role for the change in the primitive ontology – that is, 
the particle motion – are there to simplify, that is, to achieve a representation of the particle 
motion that is as simple and as informative as possible. Thus, they are not intrinsic to the 
particles or their configuration at any time. That is to say: the state of the universe at any 
given time, which enters as initial condition into the laws, contains elements that are not 
intrinsic to what there is at that time, but depend on the overall change in the universe. These 
are notably the initial values of parameters such as mass, fields, the universal wave function, 
etc. In order for these parameters to play their role to simplify the account of the motion that 
actually occurs in the universe, what role these parameters play and, notably, what their initial 
values are, depends on the change that actually occurs in the universe – that is, to stress again, 
the correct value of these parameters that enters into the state of the universe at any given time 
depends not only on what motion happens in the universe earlier than that time, but also on 
what happens later than that time. To put it in a nutshell, we do not know the initial wave 
function of the universe not only because of a principled limit on our knowledge, but also 
because what is the initial wave function of the universe is only fixed at the end of the 
universe so to speak (because it depends on what the particle motion during the evolution of 
the universe turns out to be like). 
Consequently, if human beings chose to do otherwise, in the first place, slightly different 
initial values for the dynamical parameter at the initial state of the universe would have to be 
figured out in order to achieve a system that maximizes both simplicity and informational 
content about the change that actually occurs in the universe. For the sake of illustration, 
assume that quantum physics is the correct theory of the universe. Then, what would be 
slightly different if humans chose to do otherwise than they actually did were not the 
Schrödinger equation and the Bohmian guiding equation or the GRW collapse law in the first 
place, but the universal wave function, that is, the values that this wave function takes as 
initial condition. In that way, van Inwagen’s consequence argument turns out to be invalid 
without the Humean being committed to saying that it is up to us what the laws of nature are. 
Instead, there is an ambiguity in the phrase “it is not up to us what went on before we were 
born”. If that phrase is to include reference to an initial state of the universe before we were 
born, then that initial state, insofar as it enters into a law of nature, includes values of 
parameters that are not intrinsic to that state, but that depend on what happens later in the 
universe, including the particle movements that are expressions of human free will. 
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Hence, this paper is directed against a certain sort of a scientific worldview, namely one 
that implies a misconception of the enlightenment that comes with science: it is not that 
science teaches us that if there are deterministic laws in physics – or, for the sake of the 
argument, deterministic laws in genetics or evolutionary biology –, our decisions are 
necessitated by factors that are outside of our control. In general, this paper is about limits of 
science when it comes to the central metaphysical questions. In contrast to other attempts in 
that sense that argue for a limitation of the range of physical laws within the physical domain 
itself (see e.g. von Wachter 2015 according to whom physical laws, even when they are 
deterministic, indicate only tendencies for what happens in nature), the argument of this paper 
takes universal physical laws, also when they are deterministic, at face value as encompassing 
all the motions of bodies in the universe in a simple and general equation (or at least as 
striving for that ideal, as illustrated by the Newtonian law of gravitation). The argument then 
is that attributing a modal status to these laws is not justified by the physics, even if scientific 
realism is taken for granted. From that then follow certain limits of science, in particular that 
there is no clash between the scientific representation of the motions of bodies in terms of 
universal and deterministic laws and some such motions being the manifestation of human 
free will. 
Once one has identified a primitive ontology of the natural world and thus settled for the 
concepts admitted as primitive that characterize that ontology, it is possible to define every 
further concept that enters into one’s theory of the world in terms of the function for the 
primitive ontology. This applies not only to the parameters that appear in physical theories, 
but to any concept, including the ones describing the mind. It is at least since Lewis (1972) 
well known how to provide a scheme for the functional definition also of mental concepts in 
terms of, in the last resort, changes of the physical configuration of the body and its 
environment. Such functional definitions are undisputed in the natural sciences: it would be 
odd, for instance, to postulate a heat stuff to account for thermodynamical phenomena, since 
these can be defined functionally in terms of changes in molecular motion. By the same 
token, it would be odd to postulate an élan vital to account for organisms and their 
reproduction. Again, since the advent of molecular biology, the evolution of organisms and 
their reproduction can be accounted for in terms of molecular biology. There is no 
explanatory gap here. 
However, when it comes to consciousness as well as rationality and the normativity and 
free will that are linked to rationality, one may maintain that there is an explanatory gap in the 
sense that functional definitions in terms of, in the last resort, changes in the configuration of 
matter do not capture what is characteristic of mental phenomena (see Levine 1983). Once 
one has understood the science, it is obvious how a functional definition of, for instance, 
water in terms of the effects on the interaction of H2O molecules captures and explains the 
phenomenal features of water and how a functional definition of organisms captures and 
explains their reproduction, including the link from genotypes to phenotypes. However, it is 
not obvious – at least not obvious in the sense of these paradigmatic examples – what the 
qualitative character of conscious experience, or the normativity that comes with rationality 
have to do with molecular motion in the brain. 
The argument of this paper implies the following: in case the mental cannot be functionally 
defined on the basis of a primitive ontology of matter in motion, then an ontological 
commitment to the mental is called for over and above the ontological commitment to a 
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primitive physical ontology. Moreover, such an ontological commitment then is as 
fundamental as the commitment to a primitive physical ontology, although the mental may 
only become manifest in certain systems in the universe and only at a certain period of time in 
the evolution of the cosmos. In general, whatever does not come in as being entailed by the 
primitive ontology via functional definitions is itself a further fundamental ingredient of the 
ontology (cf. e.g. Jackson 1994, or Chalmers 2012, although the argument of this paper is not 
committed to a priori entailment). This makes (again) evident the price that comes with any 
position whose ontological commitments go beyond a primitive physical ontology. 
In the case of the additional parameters figuring in scientific theories, there is no reason to 
pay that price, as argued in the previous section. But the case of the mental is different. 
Positions that seek to avoid paying that price for instance by putting their stakes on 
emergence do not cut the ontological ice: if what emerges can be functionally defined on the 
basis of the ontology that is admitted as primitive, then there is no emergence in the sense of 
something that calls for new ontological commitments. If what emerges cannot be thus 
defined, then one is committed to more in the ontology than the ontology originally admitted 
as primitive. Consequently, there then are further primitives that hence have the same 
ontological status as the original primitives. 
This is the core metaphysical debate, about the cosmos and about our place in it. Science 
can be understood on the basis of a primitive ontology that, even if the dynamics for that 
primitive ontology is deterministic, has no implications for what is right or wrong about these 
core metaphysical issues. Elaborating on the primitive ontology of science makes, however, 
clear the price that one has to pay for any further ontological commitments that then would 
have to come in as further primitives. The credibility of any such commitments hinges upon 
working them out into an overall metaphysical position that matches the paradigm of science 
in its clarity and precision as well as the concrete explanations that it provides. 
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